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Backdoor Guard — DeepSeek Harness 插件(DSH Plugin)
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dsh-backdoor-guard

Backdoor Guard

DeepSeek Harness 插件:检测训练中植入的后门载荷(静默/记忆化工具执行、凭据外泄),并在工具执行前停止智能体。与后端无关;在可提供 logprobs 时,可选择启用令牌熵检测。

插件会安装到这里;不确定时保持 web。

npx -y @deepseek-ai/dsh plugin --profile web add github:miketako3/dsh-backdoor-guard#c7dc5f0a5d48e2c804423785193774394a88204d
README兼容性版本

兼容性与来源证明

Backdoor Guard 以 dsh-backdoor-guard 发布,当前版本为 0.2.0。Plugin Hub 会校验它的 manifest,并保存精确安装来源,便于复现安装结果。

DSH 兼容范围
*
运行环境
any
发布来源
github
Registry 更新时间
2026/10/12

版本

0.2.0stable
2026/10/12
0.1.0stable
2026/10/12

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0.2.0
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未提供
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any
许可证
MIT
发布源
github
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README

dsh-backdoor-guard

English | 日本語

A DeepSeek Harness (dsh) plugin that stops trained-in backdoor payloads — model weights (e.g. a malicious QLoRa merge) that fire a specific tool call or credential exfiltration when a hidden trigger appears — before the tool executes.

Every model-requested tool call is priced by a dedicated decision model (Jev hosted, or a self-hosted LiquidAI d1 via the bundled shim — both speak the same Decision Index systemone schema). Calls judged unsafe are denied at tools/pre-execute and a SECURITY NOTICE lands in the transcript.

No fork, no logprobs, no regex rules to maintain: one public plugin seam + one judgment call (~100 ms hosted, ~30 ms local d1 on Apple silicon).

Why a decision model, not the agent's own LLM

  • A backdoored model cannot be trusted to police itself; the judge is a different, tiny, frozen model.
  • Decision models return a calibrated probability in one forward pass (zero output tokens) — fast enough to screen every tool call.
  • Jev/d1 are built for exactly this: "yes/no with a probability" over a state document (routing, moderation, guardrails).

Install

dsh plugin add dsh-backdoor-guard                 # npm, once published
dsh plugin add github:miketako3/dsh-backdoor-guard # from GitHub
dsh plugin add file:/path/to/dsh-backdoor-guard    # local checkout

The package ships a dsh.bundle layer, so plugin add wires the plugin row automatically.

Choose the judge

Option A: hosted Jev (TypeSafe AI)

export TYPESAFE_API_KEY=ts_...   # from https://console.typesafe.ai
# profile cordis.patch.yml
- id: backdoor-guard
  name: 'dsh-backdoor-guard'
  config:
    endpoint: https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemone
    model: jev-latest
    apiKeyEnv: TYPESAFE_API_KEY

Option B: local d1-3B (LiquidAI, open weights)

pip install "transformers>=5.14" torch torchvision pillow
python3 server/d1-server.py --model LiquidAI/d1-3B --port 8400
- id: backdoor-guard
  name: 'dsh-backdoor-guard'
  config:
    endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8400/v1/systemone
    model: d1-3B
    apiKeyEnv: ''        # empty = no Authorization header (local, unauthenticated)

d1-3B is ~30 ms/decision on Apple M5 Pro, ~8 ms on RTX 4090, and reads 32k-token states — whole tool-call payloads fit comfortably. d1-omni-600M works too (text+audio; experimental).

How a call is judged

The judge receives a state document: the user's latest request, whether the agent visibly announced its action (silent invocations are the runtime signature of a memorized payload), the tool name, canonicalized arguments, and the turn's earlier calls. One Noul question prices legitimacy:

safe = the call serves the user's stated request; does not read/transmit unrelated credentials or secrets; no obfuscated / pipe-to-shell / self-decoding payloads; no unusual external endpoints; nothing that looks like a hidden-trigger action.

safe_probability >= threshold → the call proceeds. Below → deny before dispatch, with the probability in the deny reason.

Config reference

keydefaultmeaning
endpointhttps://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemonesystemone-compatible judge endpoint
modeljev-latestjudge model id
apiKeyEnvTYPESAFE_API_KEYenv var with the API key; '' = no auth (local)
threshold0.5deny when safe probability falls below
timeoutMs8000judge call timeout
skipTools[]*-wildcard tool names never judged (e.g. ['read', 'web_*'])
maxArgsChars2000argument cap shown to the judge
maxRequestChars1000user-request cap shown to the judge
onJudgeErrorallowallow = log + proceed when the judge is down; deny = fail closed

Set onJudgeError: deny for high-security deployments; keep allow while tuning.

Threat model & limits

  • Targets weight-borne backdoors that act through tools and credential exfiltration; pure text misbehavior is out of scope.
  • The judge itself is trusted infrastructure: pin it (local d1 or your own Jev key), and do not route it through the model under review.
  • Pair with network egress control for complete coverage.

Inspired by @pentacoxian_dev's rdsh-backdoor-guard research (entropy-based detection); this implementation deliberately uses a decision-model judge instead, so it needs no logprobs and works with any agent backend.

Develop

npm install
npm test          # vitest: judge client + end-to-end plugin flow
npm run build     # tsc → lib/

日本語

DeepSeek Harness(dsh)用プラグイン。モデルウェイトに焼き込まれたバックドア(特定トリガーで悪意あるツール呼び出し・認証情報窃取を発火)を、ツール実行前に判定モデルで止めます。

判定には専用の意思決定モデルを使います — ホスト型の Jev(TypeSafe AI)か、同梱 shim 経由のローカル d1-3B(LiquidAI 公開ウェイト)。どちらも同じ Decision Index(systemone)スキーマを話すので、endpoint を変えるだけで切り替わります。

  • fork 不要・logprobs 不要・正規表現ルールの保守不要
  • 判定は1回の順伝播(出力トークンゼロ)で済むので全ツールコールに挟める速度(ホストJev 約100ms、M5 Pro のローカル d1 約30ms)
  • 判定対象: ユーザーの依頼文・前置きの有無(無言の発火は暗記ペイロードの特徴)・ツール名・引数・ターン内の先行呼び出し
  • 閾値未満なら tools/pre-execute で覆せない deny + トランスクリプトに SECURITY NOTICE

インストール

dsh plugin add github:miketako3/dsh-backdoor-guard

judge の選び方

  • ホスト Jev: TYPESAFE_API_KEY を環境変数に(console.typesafe.ai で発行)
  • ローカル d1-3B: python3 server/d1-server.py --model LiquidAI/d1-3B を起動し、endpoint: http://127.0.0.1:8400/v1/systemone、apiKeyEnv: ''

脅威モデルと限界

  • 対象: ツール経由で行動するウェイト由来バックドアと認証情報窃取。テキストだけの悪意ある出力は対象外
  • judge は信用されたインフラであること(ローカル d1 か自分の Jev キー)。被審査モデルと同じモデルに判定させない
  • 完全な防御にはネットワーク egress 制御と併用を

謝辞: @pentacoxian_dev 氏の rdsh-backdoor-guard 研究に着想を得た独立実装。エントロピー方式ではなく意思決定モデル方式を採用し、あらゆるエージェントバックエンドで動きます。

License

MIT