dsh-login
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Adds a login page, user accounts, and per-user conversation isolation to the DeepSeek Harness Web GUI: every visit requires sign-in, ordinary users cannot see each other's conversations, and an admin manages all accounts from inside the GUI.
The problem it solves
The DSH Web GUI ships with no login — it assumes a single user on localhost. The moment you bind it to 0.0.0.0 (phone access, LAN sharing, a small team), anyone on that network can open your GUI: read every conversation, burn your configured model API keys, even change host settings.
dsh-login turns that exposure into a multi-user deployment:
- 🔐 Login wall — pages, static assets, SPA routes, the API, and WebSockets all require a valid session; unauthenticated visitors are redirected to
/login
- 👥 Multiple accounts — the first visit creates the administrator account; further users are added by an admin right inside the GUI, no CLI needed
- 🙈 Conversation isolation — ordinary users see and act on their own conversations only (including their subagents/forks); the bridge wall denies non-whitelisted methods and narrows
session.list/session.search/workspace.list responses to owned sessions, and the composed REMOTE-layer guard scopes dispatches by ownership; other users' sessions, messages, and workspaces are invisible; credentials, host settings, and other admin domains are forbidden wholesale
- 🛠 User management — 设置 → 用户管理: last-login time, online session count, reset password, disable, remove; disabling/removing/password-changes immediately revoke that user's live sessions
- 👑 Admin exception — the admin is not isolated: all sessions visible, full configuration access
- 🚪 Logout — every user gets a logout entry in their settings panel
- 🌐 Remote access friendly — reach the GUI through frp/隧道/tunnels or a LAN IP without hand-editing
trustedHosts: the /api host-trust fence uses a live set (LAN literals + trustedHosts + auto-learned hosts), and any successful login learns its Host into a persisted whitelist you can manage in 设置 → 用户管理
Current status — released (option A)
Released: @islibaodong/dsh-login@0.3.10 (git tag v0.3.10; published on npm — latest = 0.3.10). Verified against DSH 0.2.2-alpha.3 (devDep line; full suite 21 files / 269 tests green). 0.3.10 tracks DSH 0.2.2-alpha.3 (2026-11-03, first release since 0.2.2-alpha.2): dependency retarget onto the alpha.3 tuple line + the wire surface re-pinned 199 → 204 — schedule.update/schedule.delete folded upstream into a single schedule.edit and schedule.create/run/view/deliveryLimits added (all user methods), plus the forge review surface forgePanel.changeRequestChecks/submitReview (session-scoped, user). No multi-user change upstream (see the 2026-11-04 watch and docs/adapt-dsh-0.2.2-alpha.3.md).
2026-11-04 scheduled watch — DSH 0.2.2-alpha.3 released; adapted and released as 0.3.10. dsh-v0.2.2-alpha.3 (tag commit 05b1cae8db, the vendor release commit; tagged 2026-11-03 14:19:06 +0800) is 111 commits past ce7073d512; npm alpha moved to 0.2.2-alpha.3 (published 2026-11-03T07:48:26Z) while latest/next stay 0.2.1-rc.5. Adapter surface: packages/api sees only the session-controller projection rework (~130 src lines — SessionProjectionUpdate frame payload reshaped to per-event {sessionId, seq, changes[]}; @Remote method names unchanged), everything else in the adapter-surface directories is package.json bumps; the wire registry drift 199 → 204 matches what the 11-02 watch pre-recorded on the dev tree. Verified from a built alpha.3 worktree (E:\code\deepseek-harness-wt-022a3 @ 05b1cae8db: pnpm install + pnpm run typecheck, 5 gates pass, 36 typert files): dump = 204 methods; re-classified +7/−2 (buckets 124/79/1 — see docs/adapt-dsh-0.2.2-alpha.3.md §5). Full suite green (21 files / 269 tests), dist/client.js byte-identical rebuild. Multi-user re-verified at the alpha.3 tag: the recurring multi.?user|multiuser|role.?based|\brbac\b grep still yields its single hit (packages/api/remote-access/README.md) — no native accounts; the lever is intact () so is unaffected; dsh-login remains the account layer.
@islibaodong/dsh-login@0.3.8 is released (git tag v0.3.8; published on npm — latest = 0.3.8). 0.3.8 tracks DSH 0.2.2-alpha.2 (2026-10-28): the wire surface grew 146 → 199 methods, the static-hosting seam moved upstream (PR #6901 removed the @deepseek-ai/dsh-host-frontend-static serveStatic export, so dsh-login now serves its own authenticated fallback from src/serve-static.ts — same trust shape: dist-root-confined paths, authorizeIndex() + renderIndex() on the index), and the method walls were re-derived from the real alpha.2 registry (119 user / 79 admin-only / 1 host-internal of 199, exhaustive and test-enforced). New user surface: the per-session forge panel (forgePanel.* — git worktree/change-request operations scoped to the session's own checkout, first arg sessionId the gateway resolves and the remote guard ownership-checks), session state/observation (session.events/observeEvent/observeProjections/observeState/state/wait), toolResults.watch (the session's own tool-result stream), actionCards.act, pluginRecommendations.describe. New admin-only surface: CUA consent (cuaAccess.applicationIcons/applications/enablePersistentPtc/openSettings/ptcConfiguration/requestPermission/retryApproval/revoke/systemStatus), plugin detail/update (pluginManager.listVersions/readBundleDetail/updateBundle, pluginMarket.readEntryDetail), schedule.deleteInactive, and the whole liveshareShares namespace (upstream declares it the owner-only share-management surface — publishing sessions to external viewers, host relay, owner identity, audit trail — operator territory in a multi-user deployment). 0.3.6 was the issue-#4 fix: the ordinary-user method allow-list is re-derived from the actual DSH 0.2.1-rc.2 wire surface (92 user / 53 admin / 1 host-internal of 146 methods, exhaustive and test-enforced), so model selection, add-workspace and settings→models work again for non-admins. The option-A adaptation for DSH ≥ 0.1.5-alpha.1 is complete and tracks upstream through 0.2.2-alpha.2 (verified 2026-10-28): dsh-login no longer takes over /api — the native connection + api-remotes/api-gateway stack owns the transport — and composes the login wall (fallback seat), the apiBridgeAuth wall on the shared /api bridge, and capability discovery on top of it. 0.3.0 ships the per-role whole-UI gate: with uiRoleGate: true (default) the gateway filters the window.__DSH_BOOT__ graph for ordinary users so admin-only client bundles never mount (; deny-list = ; admins and see the full graph; fail-open on any unexpected shape). The bridge wall adds (0.3.1) the per-user method gate (), owned-only response narrowing for //, ownership recording (including admin-created resources, record-only), and per-user default-workspace provisioning. 0.3.2 mirrored upstream's bind-address URL line (upstream's retirement made the takeover compat-only). 0.3.3 retargeted the devDeps to 0.2.1-alpha.3 and provided for the new row. 0.3.4 retargets the devDeps to 0.2.1-alpha.4 (peers already admitted it) and keeps the walls current with the new wire surface: alpha.4's (, typert namespace — // over the instance-wide market index list) is gated ( , two-segment deny + admin advertisement + quiet read probes for /, staying a loud 403), and the boot graph's new stamp ( — alpha.4's client reload gating) is preserved byte-identical through the filter with a regression test. 0.3.5 retargets the devDeps to 0.2.1-rc.2 (peers already admitted it, and the stable vendor re-release) — the adapter surface came out (every integration point changed only in ; the controllers have zero src diff), so the walls needed no edits; the rc.2 additions (, , ) add no wire surface. The full suite is against the published 0.2.2-alpha.2 builds, including the real-composition tests on booted servers. the per-user isolation guard composed over the native via the shipped deployment glue () and the two-browser isolation sign-off (see §B). See for this release's full surface analysis and for the original status matrix.
Delivered and working
- Login wall + multi-account user management (设置 → 用户管理).
- Capability discovery (
GET /api/auth/capabilities, session-authenticated) and quiet read-denials (204 for a no-permission read probe, 403 for writes; toggle via quietDenials), so ordinary-user browsers stop getting "forbidden" walls and retry storms.
- dsh-login's own settings contribution is already per-user: admins see 设置 → 用户管理, ordinary users see 账户 (identity + logout); ordinary users never call the admin API.
- Per-user isolation guard ships as a composition primitive (option A). Under DSH ≥ 0.1.5 the native
connection/api-gateway owns /api, so dsh-login's isolation is a REMOTE-layer guard — wrapRemoteGateway + createRemoteIsolation, exported from this package's host bundle and unit/integration-tested (including ownership scoping and admin passthrough). The wrapper forwards every non-dispatch gateway member unchanged (e.g. DSH 0.2.0-rc.2's required hasLiveClient()), so composing it stays interface-complete. connection ownership + per-user default workspace are re-established on the native stack. The guard must be composed over the native typertGateway row at boot (a deployment decision, not a runtime hot-swap — re-providing typertGateway would be a duplicate-service error); dsh-login ships ready-made glue for that composition — the ownership sidecar is published as the dshLoginOwnership service and composeDshLoginGuard(ctx, gateway) wraps a native gateway in one call (see docs/compose-guard.md for a complete row module and acceptance checklist). The two-browser behavior sign-off remains a deployment-side step. See docs/verify-option-A.md §B.
- Tracks upstream 0.1.5-alpha.1 → 0.2.2-alpha.3 (0.2.2-alpha.3 adapted and released as 0.3.10 on 2026-11-04; 0.2.1-rc.5 verified 2026-10-30 — zero surface change). Each upstream release's user-facing wire surface joins the ordinary allow-list as it lands (sidebar
terminal.*, workspace.unarchiveSession/pinSession/unpinSession, the read-only workspaceFiles/officeToPdf document preview, the controller; 0.2.0 added no new wire methods or namespaces; 0.2.1 added the namespace — agent-mod band UI above the prompt — which rides the default deny, no user surface yet; 0.2.1-alpha.2 added none; 0.2.1-alpha.3 replaced the terminal trio with the stream and admitted — the native remote-access snapshot stream that answers with only the caller's own grants; 0.2.1-alpha.4 added the namespace — admin-only wholesale, see below; 0.2.1-rc.2 added no wire methods or namespaces at all — the entire adapter surface is source-unchanged and the new rc.2 bundles (, , ) are agent-side or UI-only; 0.2.1-rc.3 added no wire methods or namespaces either — its changes are client-UI-only (navigation entry customization, nav pins/menu icons, analytics events, the llm listing re-home); 0.2.2-alpha.2 added 53 (the forge panel, session state/observation, , CUA consent, plugin detail/update, , , and Liveshare share management — classified above); 0.2.2-alpha.3 re-pinned the schedule CRUD split and the forge review surface (+7/−2: + / in, the retired out)), while new admin-only namespaces ( + , the DeepSeek-Platform controller — the one process-wide upstream grant, including 0.1.7-rc.2's expiry stream, and 0.2.1-alpha.4's , plus 0.2.2-alpha.2's namespace and its / detail-update additions) are denied wholesale. Since DSH 0.1.7-rc.1 the host runs a against peer ranges — dsh-login's ranges admit the current runtime (0.2.7 added the 0.2.1 branch), and the check is fail-open (stderr report only), so after any DSH upgrade verify the login page actually appears. 0.3.0 additionally ships — the per-role whole-UI boot-graph filter (see below).
Per-role control of the whole UI — SHIPPED in 0.3.0 (uiRoleGate)
- dsh-login 0.3.0 implements the whole-UI gate in-plugin (no upstream change needed). The gateway renders the index itself, and the client module roster travels in that HTML as
window.__DSH_BOOT__; the page then activates exactly that roster (ClientEntries.reconcile() creates one entry per manifest row and removes any bundle absent from it). For an ordinary (non-admin) session with uiRoleGate: true (the default), the gateway rewrites the boot graph before serving the index: entries in the ADMIN_ONLY_UI_PLUGINS deny-list are dropped, their batches patched or removed, and the shell never mounts them. Presentation-only — the /api allow-list (apiBridgeAuth + USER_ALLOWED) remains the security boundary. Admins get the unfiltered graph; any unexpected shape fails open (original HTML served). See docs/adapt-dsh-0.2.1-alpha.1.md §6.
- What the gate does NOT do: per-package granularity only — hiding one slot/section inside an allowed bundle (e.g. DSH's settings panel, whose
SettingsRoot → useSections list carries no identity dimension) stays out of scope. DSH's WebServer route priority is exact-beats-prefix with no pre-routing hook, so a plugin that self-registers exact routes (e.g. @linxin666/dsh-pet serving /api/pet/pets) cannot be intercepted per user by dsh-login either.
- Upstream still ships no per-identity UI gate: the client boot/activation layer and ui-slots carry no
role/permission/isAdmin concept (re-verified 2026-11-04 at 0.2.2-alpha.3 — the release's only api-side change is the session-controller projection rework, client activation untouched; the __DSH_BOOT__ lever is intact at packages/client/modules/src/index.ts:635; previously 2026-11-03 — no new release, no upstream change since; the unreleased dev tree's remote-access whenAccess/whenAllowed effect controllers are connection-axis (non-owner Peer authorization), not a UI-roster permission axis; before that 2026-11-02, 2026-10-30 at 0.2.1-rc.5, 2026-10-28 at 0.2.2-alpha.2, 2026-10-24 at 0.2.1-rc.3; isAdmin/isAllowed greps return zero hits under packages/client — and note that ~238 files still match a raw role grep because of DOM role="…" accessibility attributes, not account roles). 0.2.1-alpha.3's remote-access RBAC gates (per-resource + snapshot injection), not the client UI roster — an entirely different axis from this boot-graph gate; 0.2.1-alpha.4 changed nothing here (its graph field is release-identity plumbing for client reload gating, not a permission axis, and dsh-login's gate preserves it); 0.2.1-rc.2 re-verified unchanged; 0.2.1-rc.3 likewise (its UI changes are content-level customization, not a permission axis); 0.2.2-alpha.2 re-verified 2026-10-28 — its new client packages (forge panel UI, liveshare viewer, CUA consent UI) mount through the same boot graph with no permission axis, and the gate's deny-list is unchanged.
Upstream multi-user / RBAC evaluation (first at 0.2.1-alpha.3, 2026-10-15; re-verified 0.2.1-alpha.4, 2026-10-16, 0.2.1-rc.2, 2026-10-18, 0.2.1-rc.3, 2026-10-24, 0.2.2-alpha.2, 2026-10-28, 0.2.1-rc.5, 2026-10-30, the 2026-11-02/2026-11-03 watches — no new release, re-checked at rc.5 + the dev tree, and 0.2.2-alpha.3, 2026-11-04)
- No native user accounts — no user store, no login, no identity UI (the recurring
multi.?user|multiuser|role.?based|\brbac\b grep produced its first hit ever: packages/api/remote-access/README.md; the same single hit at 0.2.1-rc.2, 2026-10-18, 0.2.1-rc.3, 2026-10-24, 0.2.2-alpha.2, 2026-10-28, 0.2.1-rc.5, 2026-10-30, 2026-11-02, 2026-11-03 (watches; no new release), and 0.2.2-alpha.3, 2026-11-04 — the surface still has no account store). dsh-login remains the account/authn layer.
- What 0.2.1-alpha.3 actually added: a native authorize-only RBAC engine for non-owner Peers (
packages/api/remote-access: Principal/PrincipalMap — owner is the only kind today, merge-extensible — plus registerPolicy/decide per resource, an owner baseline injected as the __DSH_REMOTE_ACCESS__ global, and the always-allowed remoteAccess.follow snapshot stream) and the multi-principal connection machinery behind it (createPeer/admitConnection, v2 API cookies {version:2, id: PeerId}, the GET /connect token exchange, socket-ownership 409). This is the substrate a future native per-resource/whole-UI permission system would build on — nothing consumes it for dsh-login's use case yet.
- Why it does not change dsh-login's security model: dsh-login users reach the native stack as owner principals (the browser cookie mints
browserPeer {kind:'owner'}), and remote-access never gates owners — dsh-login's login wall, USER_ALLOWED bridge wall, remote guard, and uiRoleGate remain the actual multi-user boundary. Known substrate caveats dsh-login's own scrubbing already covers: undeclared resources are UNCHECKED, api-session added entries leak parentSessionId, the ready frame exposes full host/home. At 0.2.2-alpha.2 the substrate itself grew (role bindings over forgePanel/liveshareShares/session resource kinds, per-Peer access snapshots) but still only gates non-owner Peers — dsh-login users stay owner principals, so the assessment is unchanged (re-evaluated 2026-10-28, see docs/adapt-dsh-0.2.2-alpha.2.md §6).
- Future option (documented, not integrated): if dsh-login ever mints non-owner principals, it could register remote-access policies per dsh-login role to get native per-resource enforcement for free.
Still wanted from upstream: per-identity slot/section filtering (for sub-package granularity inside an allowed bundle) and a host-side per-user plugin activation gate. Neither exists at 0.2.2-alpha.3 (re-verified 2026-11-04: the release's changes are projection internals + schedule/forge wire methods — the remote-access substrate remains per-resource connection policy, not UI activation; previously 0.2.2-alpha.2: 0.2.1-alpha.4 added the admin-only plugin market and the release boot-graph stamp — release-identity plumbing, not a permission axis; rc.2/rc.3 added nothing here; 0.2.2-alpha.2's new UI packages ride the same activation layer — its forgePanel/liveshareShares/session RBAC additions are again connection-axis only); the 0.3.0 boot-graph gate covers whole packages only.
Quick start
No environment variables, no config edits — three steps:
# 1. Install (web is the profile that boots the Web GUI)
dsh plugin --profile web add github:islibaodong/dsh-login
- Initialize: restart
dsh web and open the GUI — the first visit shows a one-time "create administrator account" page; pick a username and password
- Add users: sign in as admin → 设置 → 用户管理 → 新建用户
Uninstall:
dsh plugin --profile web remove @islibaodong/dsh-login
Why --profile web? DSH installs plugins per profile directory ($DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>); web is the profile that boots the Web GUI. Use your profile's name if you run a custom one.
FAQ
- Do I have to log in again after restarting DSH? No — login sessions are persisted to
<dataDir>/sessions.json (0o600), so an existing cookie keeps working across a process restart (the cookie otherwise lasts 7 days by default). Only an actual log-out, password change, user removal, or TTL expiry invalidates it.
- What can an ordinary user do? Use the chat normally: create/open/continue their own sessions, run subagents, manage their own workspace content. Everything else (other people's sessions, credentials, plugins/presets/host settings, model-key management) is refused.
- Upgrading from the old single-password version? The old single password no longer logs anyone in; the first visit after upgrading bootstraps a fresh administrator account (details in the migration note below).
Technical details
For contributors, security reviewers, and troubleshooting. You don't need any of this to use the plugin.
What installation does
dsh plugin add reads this package's declared cordis.patch.yml (a bundle patch) and automatically:
- mounts the
dsh-login plugin row (config defaults are sensible; distIndex resolves the frontend dist automatically)
- disables the
web-runtime row (where dsh-web-app mounts the frontend-static fallback); dsh-login takes over the fallback seat and re-provides the webRuntime service (LAN trust for the /api fence + the DSH_WEB_URL variable)
- keeps the shipped
connection row enabled (option A, DSH ≥ 0.1.5): dsh-client-connection owns the /api carrier and browser-session auth; dsh-login composes its login wall (fallback seat) + per-user isolation primitive on top. It ships its own browser bundle dist/client.js for the settings panel only.
Manual installation (alternative)
If you prefer managing the patch file yourself, add these rows to your profile's cordis.patch.yml:
- insert:
- id: dsh-login
name: '@islibaodong/dsh-login'
config:
password: DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD # credential ref name; namespaces the user store (<name>_USERS)
distIndex: '' # empty resolves the frontend dist automatically
dataDir: '' # empty resolves to <DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login (ownership index)
sessionTtl: 604800 # 7 days (default)
autoTrustHosts: true # learn the Host of any successful login into the /api whitelist
enabled: true # set false to disable without uninstalling
defaultWorkspace: true # auto-provision a per-user default workspace on first /api access (on by default; toggleable live in 设置-用户管理)
workspaceRoot: '' # default-workspace sandbox root; empty => <DSH_HOME>/workspaces
apiBridgeAuth: true # require the dsh_session cookie on the shared /api bridge (DSH >= 0.1.6-alpha.2, on by default)
# IMPORTANT: dsh-login takes over the fallback seat, so the web-runtime row
# (which mounts frontend-static) must be disabled. dsh-login re-provides the
# webRuntime service, so the rest of the composition is unaffected.
- id: web-runtime
disabled: true
The shipped connection row (dsh-client-connection) stays enabled in option A —
it owns /api and the browser-session auth. Do not disable it. dsh-login ships a
ready-made deployment glue for per-user isolation (see docs/compose-guard.md):
fork your typertGateway row and wrap the native gateway with composeDshLoginGuard
at boot — dsh-login publishes its ownership sidecar as the dshLoginOwnership service
for exactly that composition.
Note: new rows must live under - insert: — a bare top-level row is treated as an override of an existing row and is a silent no-op for new ids; and the disable key is disabled (not disable).
First-time setup flow
- First visit (no users yet) ->
/login shows a "Create administrator account" page (username + password)
- User picks credentials ->
POST /api/auth/setup creates the forced-admin account (scrypt-hashed, stored under the ${password}_USERS credential ref, default DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD_USERS) and logs it in
- Subsequent visits ->
/login shows the normal username/password login form
- User management -> admins open 设置 → 用户管理 in the GUI to list (last login/online status), create, disable/enable, remove users and reset passwords (
/api/auth/admin/* JSON routes; removing the last admin is refused)
- Security ->
/api/auth/setup returns 403 once any user exists, preventing hijacking
Migration note: the legacy single-password credential (default ref DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD) no longer logs anyone in. It stays configured but is unused for authentication — the password config key now only namespaces the user store credential ref (${password}_USERS). Upgrading an existing single-password deployment therefore requires the first visit to bootstrap a fresh administrator account.
How it works
Request -> WebServer
├─ /login (exact) -> dsh-login: setup page (if no users) OR login page
├─ /api/auth/setup (exact) -> dsh-login: POST create admin on first use (403 if users exist)
├─ /api/auth/login (exact) -> dsh-login: POST verify {username,password}, set cookie
├─ /api/auth/logout (exact) -> dsh-login: POST revoke session, clear cookie
├─ /logout (exact) -> dsh-login: GET same revocation, redirect to /login
├─ /api/auth/me (exact) -> dsh-login: GET current session identity
├─ /api/auth/admin/* (exact) -> dsh-login: admin JSON API (users, password, disable, remove)
├─ /api/... -> native connection + api-remotes/api-gateway (option A):
│ browser-session auth, typert REMOTE dispatch, WS streams
└─ fallback -> dsh-login: auth gateway + static files
├─ no valid cookie -> 302 /login
└─ valid cookie -> serveStatic + connection.authorizeIndex
- Cookie:
dsh_session, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Path=/
- Session: 32-byte random token (256-bit) with TTL expiry; sessions carry the username and admin flag and are persisted across restarts (/sessions.json, 0o600), so an in-flight SPA keeps working after a process reload instead of turning every /api call into a 401
- Password storage: scrypt hashes (per-user salt) in the DSH credentials system under
${password}_USERS
Multi-user permission model
- Ordinary users are conversation-only. In option A the native
connection/api-gateway owns /api and is agent-keyed. Two layers now enforce the boundary:
- Method allow-list on the bridge wall (
apiBridgeAuth, always on with the wall): a non-admin POST whose wire endpoint (/api/<endpoint>, dotted like session.create) is not on the USER_ALLOWED allow-list is denied — with quietDenials (default) as a wire-correct forbidden envelope, otherwise a plain 403. GET/SSE/WS pass through to the upstream fence (the wire is POST-only).
- REMOTE-layer isolation guard (
wrapRemoteGateway, exported from this package), composed over typertGateway via the deployment glue (docs/compose-guard.md): restricts ordinary users to their own sessions plus lineage children (subagents/forks — ownership follows parentSessionId), scoped by the ownership sidecar the wall keeps warm.
- Response narrowing on the bridge wall:
session.list / session.search / workspace.list responses of an ordinary user are filtered down to their owned sessions (workspaces keep only owned sessionIds and drop out when none remain) — defense-in-depth on top of the guard, so other users' sessions are invisible even in list projections.
Everything else is off limits:
- physical allow-list: the user-facing wire surface (
USER_ALLOWED, 92 of the 146 methods DSH 0.2.1-rc.3 actually exposes) — session.* (19: prompt/page/modelCatalog/selectModel/fork/attachment/…), workspace.* (10 of 11), goals.*, subagents.*, terminal.* (8), job.*, workspaceFiles.*/officeToPdf.* (the read-only document preview), llm.listProviders/llm.listConfigurableProviders/llm.discoverModels (the model picker + settings→models), skills.list, commands.*, directoryPicker.* (adding a workspace directory), schedule.*, speech.*, userQuestions.*, messageFeedback.*, sessionFeedback.record, , , , , , and the grant stream; any other wire method is refused (enforced by the bridge wall's method gate for ordinary users; the REMOTE-layer guard denies the same set at the dispatch layer once composed). The list is exhaustive against the wire surface: fails if upstream renames or adds a method without a bucket (see )
Data locations
| Data | Location |
|---|
| User accounts (scrypt hashes) | DSH credentials system, ref ${password}_USERS (default DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD_USERS) |
| Session→user ownership sidecar | <DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/ownership.json (configurable via dataDir; DSH_HOME env or ~/.dsh) |
| Auto-learned / admin Host whitelist | <DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/trusted-hosts.json (configurable via dataDir) |
| Default-user-workspace toggle | <DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/settings.json (configurable via dataDir) |
| Remote-web-ui compat toggle | <DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/settings-remote-web-ui.json (configurable via dataDir) |
| Login sessions | <DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/sessions.json (0o600; persisted across restarts, TTL drops stale) |
/api integration (option A, DSH ≥ 0.1.5-alpha.1)
For DSH ≥ 0.1.5-alpha.1 dsh-login no longer takes over the /api carrier: cordis.patch.yml
leaves the shipped connection row enabled, so dsh-client-connection + api-remotes /
api-gateway own the /api transport and the live Remote streams. dsh-login composes its
per-user layer on top of that native stack (see docs/adapt-dsh-0.1.5.md
and the verification checklist docs/verify-option-A.md):
fallback login wall + static serving through the native serveStatic, plus
connection.authorizeIndex on index responses so the browser receives its upstream /api
cookie. The old src/connection.ts carrier takeover and its dist/client.js re-stamp were
removed with the dsh-host-apiproxy-based per-user ApiProxy. The per-user conversation /
workspace isolation is re-homed as a REMOTE-layer guard — wrapRemoteGateway +
createRemoteIsolation, exported from this package's host bundle and unit/integration-tested —
which a deployment composes over the native typertGateway at boot using the shipped glue
(dsh-login publishes its ownership sidecar as the dshLoginOwnership service;
composeDshLoginGuard / docs/compose-guard.md). The two-browser
behavioral sign-off of that composition is the remaining, boot-bound step (see
docs/verify-option-A.md §B).
Host trust is evaluated live per request. The /api fence uses a deduped effective set —
LAN literals from the web runtime + trustedHosts + the persisted whitelist (src/hosts.ts).
A successful login/setup auto-learns the request Host (gated by autoTrustHosts, default
true), so a public host reached through frp/隧道/tunnels is trusted after one login; learned
hosts bind immediately and removals apply without a restart.
Security notes
Protected by the gateway
| Asset | Protection |
|---|
Page navigation (/) | 302 redirect to /login if unauthenticated |
Static assets (/assets/*.js, .css, etc.) | Same gateway check |
SPA routes (/conversations, /settings, etc.) | Same gateway check |
The process launch token never reaches remote clients (issue #10). The
core mints one random launch token per process; dsh web prints the
/?token=… URL in the local console only, and that token is what mints
the browser cookie and what GET /connect exchanges for an owner-principal
API credential. Earlier releases bootstrapped a fresh device by bouncing the
browser to /?token=<launchToken>, which exposed the token to the remote
client (Location header → browser history, proxy access logs) — dsh-login
0.3.9 instead runs the same exchange server-side and serves the index
directly with the minted cookie, so the token never appears on the wire. A
remote user can therefore never reach owner credentials through dsh-login;
the token remains a local-console-only secret, exactly as upstream delivers
it.
Protected by the bridge wall
| Asset | Protection |
|---|
API requests (/api/*) | isTrustedApiRequest host trust and a valid dsh_session cookie (401 without one); non-allowed POST methods denied for ordinary users (wire-correct forbidden envelope with quietDenials, else 403); session.list/session.search/workspace.list responses narrowed to owned sessions |
WebSocket (/api/events.mux, /api/events.host) | Host-trust + browser-auth checks on upgrade (upstream fence — no per-request hook exists there); per-user frame filtering is provided by the composed REMOTE-layer guard, not the upgrade fence |
Recommendations for public exposure
- With
autoTrustHosts on (default), any successful login learns its Host into the whitelist (/api/auth/admin/hosts, manageable in 设置 → 用户管理), so an frp/tunnel host is trusted after one login — no trustedHosts editing needed. Keep it on unless you want only loopback + an explicit trustedHosts set to be accepted.
- Use a reverse proxy (nginx/caddy) with TLS termination in front of DSH.
- The gateway cookie is
SameSite=Strict, protecting against CSRF on the login/logout endpoints.
Troubleshooting: a non-admin user "cannot add a workspace" over a public tunnel?
Diagnosis quick reference: this is almost never the host whitelist (autoTrustHosts already learns the public host and login succeeds). On ≤ 0.3.5 the blocker was the method gate: the frontend's add-workspace flow calls the directory picker, and 0.3.5's USER_ALLOWED carried the pre-0.2 spellings (host.pickDirectory, …), so non-admins were denied with not permitted for this user / HTTP 403. 0.3.6 fixes exactly this (issue #4): the real picker is directoryPicker.pick/list/createDirectory and it is admitted to ordinary users.
- The picker is safe to admit because the privilege boundary sits one call later:
workspace.create is confined to the caller's sandbox (workspaceRoot/<username>), so a non-admin cannot register a workspace outside it. Ordinary users can already run shell as the host user through terminal.*, so browsing hosts files adds no new capability class.
defaultWorkspace (on by default) still gives every non-admin a ready-made isolated sandbox on first /api access, so they never need the picker — but they can now use the native flow too.- If
/api still answers not permitted for this user on 0.3.7+, the method is off this build's wire surface: check the host log for the one-per-method dsh-login: /api/<method> was denied … line (it names the DSH version the allow-list targets) and re-sync with node scripts/dump-wire-surface.mjs.
Architecture note: fallback vs prefix /
The gateway uses registerFallback() (not register({ kind: 'prefix', path: '/' })) because the DSH WebServer's prefix matching checks pathname.startsWith(prefix + '/'). For prefix /, this becomes //, which no normal path starts with -- a prefix / route only matches the exact path /. The fallback handler catches everything no named route claims, which is the correct catch-all behavior for the authentication gateway.
The WebServer has a single fallback seat. dsh-web-app's web-runtime row mounts frontend-static over it unconditionally, so the web-runtime row must be disabled when using dsh-login; dsh-login re-provides the webRuntime service that row owned (LAN trust, DSH_WEB_URL), leaving the rest of the composition intact.
Running tests
# Canonical full suite (269 tests, green under option A against DSH 0.1.5-alpha.1 through 0.2.2-alpha.2; requires the DSH checkout for package
# resolution — set DSH_HARNESS_CHECKOUT or run beside the default path)
npx vitest run
The .spec.ts files are the canonical vitest definitions, including the pure/multi-user-adjacent suites (users, ownership, hosts, admin-api, session, gateway, capabilities, remote-web-ui-compat, client-bundle, settings-panel, plugin-entry, bridge-list-filter, …). The connection / api-filter / multiuser-e2e specs were removed in the option-A adaptation (they tested the deleted dsh-host-apiproxy /api takeover); the REMOTE-layer isolation guard is covered by tests/remote-guard.spec.ts (ownership scoping, admin passthrough, array/nested id-arg ownership) and the bridge wall (401 + method gate + quiet denials + record/filter tee + provisioning trigger) by tests/api-bridge-auth.spec.ts. tests/runner.mjs and tests/integration-runner.mjs are sandbox-compatible harnesses for the original single-password core only; they were not extended for the multi-user feature. The live two-browser isolation sign-off (§B of docs/verify-option-A.md) still requires a booted deployment.
Project structure
src/
├── index.ts # Cordis plugin entry: registers auth routes, fallback login gateway, webRuntime
├── config.ts # schemastery config schema (password, distIndex, dataDir, sessionTtl, ...)
├── users.ts # UserStore: user records, scrypt hashing, credentials-backed persistence
├── session.ts # SessionStore: sessions (user + admin flag) with TTL expiry, persisted across restarts
├── ownership.ts # OwnershipIndex: sessionId → username sidecar (debounced JSON file)
├── hosts.ts # TrustedHosts: trusted-host whitelist (live set + debounced JSON persistence)
├── api-filter.ts # pure predicates (AuthUser/USER_ALLOWED/isUserAllowed) for the per-user admission seam
├── bridge-list-filter.ts # wire-response observation: owned-session closure + session/workspace.list narrowing (used by the bridge wall)
├── host-session-access.ts # lazy host-side session surface (sessionController first, typertGateway fallback) for provisioning/list-probe
├── provision.ts # DefaultWorkspaceProvisioner: per-user sandbox + registry workspace + seeded attached session
├── glue.ts # deployment-side composition glue (dshLoginOwnership service + composeDshLoginGuard), see docs/compose-guard.md
├── settings-panel.client.js # settings-panel browser half (plain JS): 用户管理/账户 section, theme-token styled
├── workspace-setting.ts # 默认用户工作空间 runtime toggle (extends BooleanSetting)
├── boolean-setting.ts # live + persisted {enabled} runtime flag shared by admin switches
├── remote-web-ui-compat.ts # writes remote-web-ui's enabled+requirePairingForLan+publicBaseUrl (settings-backed, live) to mount its routes & bypass pairing / trust the public host
├── capabilities.ts # capability discovery (deriveCapabilities) + read-probe classifier (isReadProbe/QUIET_DENY_METHODS)
├── admin-api.ts # /api/auth/me + /api/auth/capabilities + /api/auth/admin/* JSON routes (settings-panel backend)
├── auth.ts # Cookie management + constant-time compare helpers
├── gateway.ts # Auth gateway fallback (login wall + serveStatic + upstream connection.authorizeIndex)
├── login-api.ts # POST /api/auth/login + logout + setup
├── login-page.ts # Login and setup page HTML
├── http-json.ts # readBody/sendJson helpers + resolveDshHome
├── remote-guard.ts # REMOTE-layer per-user isolation guard (wrapRemoteGateway + createRemoteIsolation), exported from the host bundle
└── web-runtime.ts # webRuntime takeover: LAN trust + DSH_WEB_URL
tests/ (option-A suite: 19 files / 247 tests green)
└── *.spec.ts # vitest test definitions
License
MIT
